Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

10-10-1952

Lawrence Barker, Inc. v. Briggs
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Lawrence Barker, Inc. v. Briggs" (1952). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 355.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/355

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

654

LAWRENCE BARKER, INC.

v.

BRIGGS

[39 C.2d

nature of the transaction whereby Atha acquired her interest
from Mark or the amounts of the various mortgages and
payments involved. There is thus no evidence which would
warrant the appellate court in making additional findings
for the purpose of affirming the judgment for Atha in part.
Because the evidence is insufficient to warrant a recovery
by Atha upon any of the legal grounds advanced by the
parties upon trial or appeal, or even upon the new theory
which is the basis of the decision, I would reverse the judgment.

[L. A. No. 21947. In Bank.

Oct. 101 1952.]

LAWRENCE BARKER, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent,
v. WALTER M. BRIGGS, Appellant.
[1] Limitation of Actions-Instruments in Writing.-Lessee's

- claim for damages based on lessor's failure to maintain a party
wall in safe condition as required by terms of lease is governed
by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause
of action founded on a written instrument. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 337.)
[2] Landlord and Tenant-Unlawful Detainer.-A lessor's action
to recover possession of real property is not one for unlawful
detainer where plaintiff does not comply with the statutory
notice requirements for such detainer. (See Civ. Code, § 793;
Code Civ. Proc., § 1159 et seq.)
[3] Set-o:ff and Counterclaim-Requisites and Subject Matter.Although lessor suing in ejectment to recover possession of
real property Beeks no money damages other than attorney's
fees as provided in the lease, such fees constitute a sufficient
prayer for damages to entitle defendant to counterclaim for
damages suffered by him because of plaintiff's alleged breach
of provisions of the lease pertaining to maintenance of a party
wall.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 59; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 79 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Set-off and Counterclaim, § 13; Am.Jur., Set-off
and Counterclaim, § 24 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Limitation of Actions, § 32; [2] .
Landlord and Tenant, § 277; [3] Set-off and Counterclaim, § 19;
[4] Judgments, § 14; [5] Landlord and Tenant, § 197.
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[4] Judgments- Declaratory Judgments- Refusal of Relief.Where parking lot lease provides for minimum monthly rental
plus a percentage of the gross receipts in excess of a certain
sum based on gross income "derived in any manner, directly
or indirectly, from or by the use or occupancy'' of such premises, and the quoted words can be construed either in accordance with the lessor's theory that it is entitled to the entire
revenue or in accordance with the lessee's theory that he is
only to account for a percentage of the revenue for cars
entering that lot but actually parked on another lot located
on adjacent premises which he had leased from another lessor,
such lessee states a cause of action for declaratory relief and
the trial court errs in finding that "there is no occasion to
enter any declaratory judgment."

[5] Landlord and Tenant-Termination of Lea.se-l'orfeiture.-A
forfeiture of a lease did not result from the lessor's reentry
and repossession of the leased premises on the lessee's alleged
default; and where the lease specifically provided that lessor
could hold or sell the securities deposited with it, on lessee's
default, either during or at the end of the term of the lease,
retention of the deposit did not constitute a forfeiture, especially where lessee did not request that the sum retained by
lessor be returned to him .

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed.
Action to recover possession of real property. Judgment for
plaintiff reversed.
Benjamin J. Goodman and Krystal & Paradise for Appellant.
Kenyon F. Lee, Thomas D. Mercola, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher and Sherman Welpton, Jr., for Respondent.
Richard Culbert Olson, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, Lawrence Barker, Inc., recovered
judgment entitling it to immediate possession of certain real
property leased by it to defendant, Walter M. Briggs. The
judgment provided that defendant was not entitled to take
anything by reason of his counterclaim and that he was not
entitled to a declaratory judgment by reason of his crosscomplaint. Plaintiff recovered costs and attorney's fees .
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The lease involved in the controversy was entered into on
January 1, 1945, for a 10-year term by Lawrence Barker,
Inc., as lessor, and Walter M.· Briggs, as lessee. The lease
covered premises consisting of one lot located on Spring
Street in the city of Los Angeles, which was to be used by
the lessee as a parking lot. Pursuant to the lease, Briggs
entered into possession and operated thereon an automobile
parking lot or station. Subsequent to the execution of this
lease, defendant Briggs, who operated approximately 70 other
s11ch lots in the vicinity of Los Angeles, ent ered into another
parking lot lease with another lessor. This subsequent lease
covered premises located on Main Street adjacent to the premises in question but separated by a 20-foot public alley. The
premises in question will hereinafter be referred to as the
Spring Street lot and the Main Street lot. The provisions
of the lease involved here are as follows:
''SECOND : The Lessee covenants and agrees to pay to the
Lessor as a monthly rental for the demised premises the sum
of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty ($1,250.00) Dollars
per month, payable in advance upon the 1st day of each
month of said term. In. addition to the monthly rental payments, Lessee covenants and agrees annually to pay to the
Lessor the amount, if any, by which sixty (60%) per cent
of the gross income or receipts of the Lessee, derived in any
manner, directly or ind1:rectly, from or by the use or occupancy
of said demised premises ill any one calendar year, exceeds
the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars. Lessee
agrees annually to furnish to Lessor a report or statement,
prepared and certified by a reputable Certified Public Accountant, showing said gross income or receipts of Lessee from
said demised premises, as aforesaid, during the preceding
calendar year, paying at the same time any such additional
rent shown by said report or statement to be due the Lessor
from the Lessee. Said report or statement shall be furnished,
and said payment of additional rent, if any be due, shall
be made, within a reasonable time after the close of each
calendar year of the term of this lease, and in no event later
than sixty (60) days after said close of said calendar year.
The expense of said report or statement shall be borne by
the Lessee.''
''THIRD : The Lessee has deposited with Lessor concurrently
with the execution of this Lease certain stocks and securities.
. . . Said stocks and securities . . . are deposited for the
purpose of, and shall be held as, security to the Lessor for
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the performance by the Lessee of all the terms, agreements,
covenants and conditions of this lease. . . . Title to said
stocks and securities, originally constituting said 'deposit',
has been transferred or shall be transferred to the name of
Lessor, and Lessor may continue to hold said 'deposit' in
its own name. . . . In the event that Lessee, shall be in default under any of the terms, agreements, covenants, or conditions of this lease, other than the covenants for the payment
of r'ent, and said default shall continue for the period of thirty
( 30) days, after notice by Lessor to Lessee, or if default be
made in the payment of rent, when the same is due and payable, and said default in the paym~nt of rent shall continue
for a period of thirty (30) days, no notice of default in
the payment of rent being necessary, Lessor may sell, at public or private sale, with or without notice, any or all of the
stock or securities. . . . Upon the expiration of .. . this
lease, provided Lessee be not in default at said time, or upon
its earlier termination by the mutual consent of Lessor and
Lessee, the 'deposit' shall be delivered by Lessor to Lessee
and all rights of Lessor in and to said deposit shall thereupon
cease and terminate. However, should Lessee, at said expiration of said stated term, the lease having not been terminll.ted
earlier by mutual consent, be in default under any of thP
terms, agreements, covenants and conditions of this lease,
said 'd~posit' shall continue to be held by Lessor until all
such defaults of Lessee are cured, Lessor having during said
period of default all of its original rights therein, as if the
term of this lease had not expired. . . . ''
"NINTH: It is expressly covenanted and agreed by and
between the parties hereto that in case at any time default
shall be made by the Lessee in the payment of any rent herein
provided for upon the day when the same shall become due
or payable, and such default shall continue for ten (10) days,
or in case default shall be made by the Lessee in the performance of any of the other terms, conditions or covenants of
said lease by said Lessee to be performed, other than the
covenant for the payment of rent, and said default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after the service of
written notice of such default by the Lessor on the Lessee
(no notice of default in the payment of rent being necessary),
. . . then and in any of such cases, the Lessor may enter into
and upon the demised premises or any part thereof and repossess the same, with or uJithout terminating this lease, a;nd
tm:thmd prejudice to any of its remedies for rent or breach of
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covenant, and in any such event may, at its option, terminate
said lease by giving written notice of its election so to do,
or may, at its option, let the premises or any part thereof
as the agent of the Lessee, or otherwise . . . . The foregoing
rights and remedies hereinabove given to the Lessor are, and
shall be deemed to be, cumulative, and the exercise of one
shall not be deemed to be an election, excluding the exercise
by the Lessor at any other or different time of a different or
inconsistent remedy, and shall be deemed to be given to said
Lessor in addition to any other and further rights given or
granted to said Lessor by the terms of paragraph 'THIRD'
herein, or by law, and the failure upon the part of the Lessor
at any time to exercise any right or remedy hereby given to
it shall not be deemed to operate as a waiver by it of its right
to exercise such right or remedy at any other or future time."
Beginning in 1948, and after defendant had entered into
the second lease covering the Main Street lot, when the Spring
Street lot was filled with cars, defendant would move the
"overflow" cars from Spring Street across the alley to the
Main Street lot. He kept records of the number of cars
so moved, but kept no records as to how much rental he received per car. For example, he could not tell whether he
had received 25 cents, 50 cents or $1.00 or more for each of
the cars moved. In accounting to the plaintiff-lessor, he allowed 25 per cent of the gross reGeipts on overflow cars
parked on the Main Street lot. At about this time, he operated both lots at night with an attendant stationed on the Main
Street lot. This attendant serviced cars entering on the Spring
Street lot but issued Main Street parking tickets to them.
During 1948, and until July, 1949, no records were kept of
gross receipts for night parking on the Spring Street lot, although defendant allocated a portion of the Main Street night
gross receipts to the Spring Street lot. Defendant continued
to use the Spring Street lot as a feeder and driveway for the
Main Street lot up until the time plaintiff discovered that
method of operation and told him to desist. On July 27th,
subsequent to notice given by plaintiff, defendant started to
keep a record of night receipts derived from cars entering
and parked on the Spring Street lot.
Prior to _the commencement of this action, defendant submitted annual reports or statements as required by the lease,
although they were not certified, and the reports he did furnish were, with one exception, not furnished within the 60day period from the close of the calendar year as required by
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the lease. Plaintiff, prior to 1949, made no objection to the
belated and inadequate reports. 'l'he 1949 report was submitted within the time provided for in the lease agreement.
Plaintiff, on July 22, 1949, served on defendant written
notice of default in whic.P. it claimed the right to repossess
the premises without terminating the lease and without prejuuice to any other rights provided for in the lease. Defendant
claimed that he was not in default under the terms of the
lease and refused to surrender possession. Plaintiff then
brought this action for recovery of possession of the premises,
defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach, by the
plaintiff, of a covenant in the lease pertaining to a party wall.
Defendant also filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory
relief, alleging that the terms and provisions of the lease were
uncertain and ambiguous, and seeking an adjudication of the
respective parties' rights thereunder.
In the cross-complaint it was alleged that defendant had
paid the minimum rent up until, and including, June 1,
1949; that commencing July 1, 1949, he has tendered to
plaintiff the minimum rent per month plus the sum of
$3,707.50 which represented additional rent for the calendar
year of 1949 ''in accordance with paragraph Second of said
lease" but that plaintiff has refused to accept such tender;
that the money is now on deposit in a special bank account.
It is also alleged that an actual controversy exists between
the parties as to the interpretation of the lease in that defendant claims that he is entitled to allocate gross income or
receipts to the parking lot actually used to park the particular car, whereas plaintiff claims that, under the lease, if the
cars enter the Spring Street lot but are parked in the Main
Street lot, the receipts for those cars should be credited to
the Spring Street lot. Defendant further alleges that his
''method of allocating gross income or receipts as between
the demised premises and other parking lots operated as a
unit with the demise~ premises constitutes a fair and reasonable method of allocation and that cross-defendant received its just, fair and proportional share of the gross income
or receipts attributable to the use or occupancy of the dl;lmised
premises.'' Defendant alleges that plaintiff had waived strict
compliance with the terms of the lease pertaining to statements or reports. The trial court was requested, if any money
was found due and owing to plaintiff, to give defendant a reasonable opportunity to pay the same, to relieve him from de-
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fault and from any cancellation or the forfeiture of any of
his rights.
The minimum rental of $1,250 per month was the only rent
paid by defendant and is not an issue in this case. Percentage rental for the calendar years 1945, 1946 and 1947 is
not in issue. The dispute centers around the percentage
rental for the calendar years 1948 and 1949.
Defendant's C01tnterclaim
Defendant's counterclaim was based on paragraph twelfth
of the lease which reads as follows: "The demised premises
as accepted by Lessee are subject to a party wall agreement
with respect to the southern wall of the building adjoining
the demised premises on the north. Pursuant to the terms of
said agreement, Lessor has certain maintenance · obligations
with respect to said party wall. Lessor shall not be relieved of
its said maintenance obligations with respect to said party
wall and said obligations are not assumed by Lessee, except
that should Lessee in some manner avail himself of the rights
of Lessor in and to said party wall, and use said party wall
in connection with said Lessee's use and occupation of the
demised premises, then and in such event, Lessee shall be
deemed to have assumed and thereafter shall perform all
obligations of Lessor with respect to the maintenance of said
party wall.'''
Defendant alleged that during the period from approximately August 15, 1946, until October 15, \946, through the
negligence and carelessness of the plaintiff he was deprived
· of the use of the premises by reason of the party wall becoming a hazard to anyone using the premises, as a result of
which the wall was condemned by the Building and · Safety
Department of the City of Los Angeles. It was alleged that
be bad not availed himself of the rights of the lessor in and
to the party wall and that he had not used it in connection
with the use of the premises. He prayed for damages in the
sum of $3,731.20. Plaintiff objeeted to the introduction of
evidence under the counterclaim on the ground that it was
barred by section 339, subdivision 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (liability not founded upon a writing) and that the
counterclaim did not tend to diminish or defeat plaintiff's
recovery. Defendant thereupon made an offer of proof to
show that the city of Los Angeles bad, on or about August
25, 1946, served defendant with a written notice which required him to immediately vacate and give up the use and
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occupancy of the auto parking lot because of the dangerous
condition of the premises and that as a result of this notice
he was compelled to shut down the parking lot to his damage
in the sum of $3,731.20. [1] It is defendant's contention
that the applicable statute of limitation is found in section
337 of the Code of Civil Procedure (action founded upon a
written instrument) and that the counterclaim was :filed on
October 3, 1949, less than four years from the_ date of the
alleged breach by plaintiff of the provision contained in the
lease. This would appear to be the correct statute of limitation. In Tagus Ranch Co. v. Hughes, 64 Cal.App.2d 128
[148 P.2d 79], the court held that all obligations and promises which the words of the writing necessarily import must
be regarded as included in the terms of the writing, under
section 337, Code of Civil Procedure. The cause of action
here for damages did not arise until plaintiff breached the
terms and provisions of the contract.
Aside from the merits of the counterclaim, whether or not
defendant may counterclaim depends on the type· of plaintiff's
action and· whether or not it will "tend to diminish or
defeat the plaintiff's recovery" (Code Civ. Proc., § 438).
[2] Plaintiff maintains that its action is not one of ejectment, but that it was brought under section 793 of the Civil
Code which reads as follows: "An action for the possession
of real property leased or granted, with a right of re-entry,
may be maintained at any time, after the right to re-enter
has accrued, without the notice prescribed in section seven
hundred and ninety-one." (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1159 et
seq.) Inasmuch as plaintiff did not comply with the statutory
notice requirements for unlawful detainer, it would appear
that this is not such an action.
[3] If the action is one in ejectment as it appears to be
and which is proper in such a situation (Raffinella v. Raffinella,
191 Cal. 753 [218 P. 397]; B. &; B. Sulphur Ca. v. Kelley, 61
Cal.App.2d 3 [141 P.2d 908]), then the question arises
whether the defendant's claim will tend to diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery. Plaintiff seeks no money damages
other than attorney's fees, as provided for in the lease, but
such fees would seem to be a sufficient prayer for damages to
entitle defendant to counterclaim for damages suffered by
him because of plaintiff's alleged breach of the twelfth paragraph of the lease which pertains to maintenance of the party
wall.

662

LAWRENCE BARKER, INC.

v.

BRIGGS

[39 C.2d

Defendant's Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief
The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying declaratory relief under the cross-complaint. The trial court found that in view of the findings
made, there was no occasion to enter any declaratory judgment; that plaintiff was entitled to be placed in immediate
possession of the leased premises but made no finding as to
whether or not plaintiff was entitled to repossession of the
premises without terminating the lease. More specifically
the trial court found that the reports furnished to plaintiff,
with one exception, although prepared and signed by a member of a firm of certified public accountants, were not certified and were not furnished within the 60-day period and
that they did not correctly reflect the gross income attributable to the use and occupation of the leased premises. It was
also found that the gross revenue attributable to the leased
premises for the year 1949 should have been $35,485.60 instead of $31,179.17, as reported by defendant; that the sum
of $3,707.50 tendered by defendant to, and refused by, plaintiff, should have been the sum of $6,291.36. It was further
found that plaintiff had not waived "these defaults" and
had not led the defendant to believe that strict compliance
with· the terms of the lease would be waived in the future.
Other than the specific references made, and the use of the
words "these defaults," the trial court made no attempt to
construe the lease. No finding was made as to whether plaintiff's interpretation of the terms of the lease is the correct one,
and although it may be inferred that defendant was in default
because of his interpretation of the lease, no .finding is made
thereon. The findings as to the incorrect gross receipts report
could, moreover, refer either to the overflow and night parking receipts or to the gross receipts on cars actually parked
on the Spring Street lot.
The percentage rental plaintiff was to receive over and
above the minimum monthly rental was to be the amount by
which 60 per cent of the gross receipts exceeded the sum of
$15,000, and was to be based on gross income "derived in any
manner, directly or indirectly, from or by the use or occupancy
of said demised premis'e s." No finding other than by implication from the judgment was made as to whether this provision of the lease applied to the manner in which defendant
operated the two lots (parking cars entering Spring Street in
the Main Street lot) so as to entitle plaintiff to the revenue
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received in thus placing defendant in default for failing to
account therefore other than on a percentage basis.
In Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200 [15 N.E.2d
576, 118 A.L.R. 789] , the court said: ''The two words (directly
or indirectly) must have been used with some definite intent
and purpose; otherwise why were they used at all? Aid furnished 'directly' would be that furnished in a direct line, both
literally and figuratively, to the school itself, unmistakably earmarked, and without circumlocution or ambiguity. Aid furnished 'indirectly' clearly embraces any contribution, to
whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or
otherwise not in a straight, open and direct course for the open
and avowed aid of the school, that may be to the benefit of
the institution or promotional of its interests and purposes.
How could the people have expressed their purpose in the
fundamental law in more apt, simple and all-embracing language?" (See, also, Nelson v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 255 [36 N.W.
868]; Kirkpatrick v. State, 177 Ark. 1124 [9 S.W.2d 574].)
In Goodman v. Global Industries, 80 Cal.App.2d 583, 587 [182
P.2d 300], the court, in construing section 342 of the Civil
Code had this to say concerning the legislative use of the
words ''directly or indirectly'' : ''The words 'directly or indirectly' indicate the intention to comprehend and include all
types of repurchases however devised, and when the section
is read in its entirety it is clear . . . that it was designed to
prohibit any purchase by a corporation of its own shares
except under conditions prescribed within the section's own
four corners."
[4] The words "directly or indirectly" and "from or by
the use or occupancy" of the premises could be construed
in accordance with plaintiff's theory or, as defendant contends
that they should be construed, namely, that he, defendant, was
to account to plaintiff for only a percentage of the revenue
received for cars entering the Spring Street lot but actually
parked on the Main Street lot and for cars entering the Main
Street lot at night and thereafter parked on the Spring Street
lot. If, as defendant contends, plaintiff is entitled only to
a percentage of the revenue, rather than the entire revenue,
from cars so parked, then the determination of the amount
of that percentage is a question for the trial court. It is clear,
therefore, that defendant stated a cause of action for declaratory relief and that the trial court erred in finding that "there
is no occasion to enter any declaratory judgment."
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Termination of the Lease

[5]

Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain an
action in ejectment without terminating the lease, and that he
is entitled to relief from forfeiture.
In Yates v. Reid, 36 Cal.2d 383 [224 P.2d 8], although the
facts differ from the case under consideration, the lease contained a provision that in the event of abandonment or vacation of the premises by the tenant, the lessor could reenter
and take possession and might ''at his option, either terminate
this lease and recover from the Lessee all damages caused by
the breach hereof of the Lessee . . . . No re-entry of said
property by the Lessor, as herein provided, shall be construed
as an election on his part to terminate this lease, unless written notice to that effect is delivered to the Lessee. . . . '' This
court held that the ~etaking of possession by the plaintiff as
landlord and his reletting of the premises were entirely consistent with the rights of the tenants under the lease; that
the plaintiff did no more than exercise the rights accorded to
him; that the provision in the lease was valid and controlling
(Burke v. Norton, 42 Cal.App. 705 [184 P. 45] ; Brown v.
Lane, 102 Cal.App. 350 [283 P. 78]; Security Realty· Oo. v.
Kost, 96 Cal.App. 626 [274 P. 608]).
In Burke v. Norton, supra, 42 Cal.App. 705, again the same
provision was involved and plaintiff-lessor brought an action
to recover rent, attorney's fees, damages and restoration of
the premises. There, the court, quoting from Grommes v.
St. Paul Trust Oo., 147 Ill. 634 [35 N.E. 820, 37 Am.St.Rep.
248], said : " 'There is nothing illegal or improper in an
agreement that the obligation of the tenant to pay all the rent
to the end of the term shall remain, notwithstanding there
has been a re-entry for default ; and if the parties choose to
make such an agreement, we see no reason why it should not
be held valid as against both the tenant and his sureties.' We
think this language is applicable to the case at bar. To hold
otherwise, it seems to us, would be to place a lessee in a
position to retain the premises Without the payment of rent,
and to compel the lessor to rely wholly upon the financial
responsibility of the lessee and seek his rent from month to
month by action, or to wholly terminate the lease, either of
which would be less advantageous to the landlord than the
right to re-enter and, if necessary, to relet the premises, looking to the lessee for only that portion of the rental reserved
which represents the difference between what the landlord
could obtain from any person upon such reletting and the
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total monthly rental. We do not hesitate to say that a construction which would thus permit a lessee to determine his
own liability is, as we understand them, repugnant to the
decisions of this state [citing many cases]. From what we
have said, it follows that the court erred in declaring a
forfeiture of the lease." It would follow from the above quoted
decision that so far as the reentry and repossession of the
premises by plaintiff was concerned, defendant suffered no
forfeiture.
Paragraph third of the lease heretofore quoted contains
provisions relating to the deposit which was intended by the
parties as security for the faithful performance of the terms,
conditions and covenants of the lease. It was specifically provided that plai.D.tiff could hold or sell the securities so deposited, upon defendant's default, either during, or at the
end of, the term of the lease. It would appear that the retention of this sum by plaintiff does not constitute a forfeiture.
Moreover, defendant does not request that it be returned to
him. It is difficult to see where there is any forfeiture involved
here.
Defendant does pray that if the court finds that any sum is
owed by him to plaintiff he be given a reasonable time
within which to pay it. Plaintiff does not request any damages, nor any money whatever except for attorney's fees and
costs. The trial court did find, as heretofore set forth, that
defendant had not tendered the correct amount to plaintiff as
percentage rental for the calendar year 1949. It would appear
that any finding as to the amount of percentage rental owing
by defendant (under plaintiff's construction of the lease)
would be pure speculation in the absence of any records as
to the revenue collected in the daytime for cars entering the
Spring Street lot but parked in the Main Street lot, and the
number of cars either parked in, or which entered, the Spring
Street lot during the nighttime parking hours.
In the absence of any findings on material issues presented (wherein lay defendant's default, other than the
belated and uncertified annual reports ; whether or not the
second paragraph of the lease is to be interpreted according
to the theory advanced by plaintiff or defendant; whether
plaintiff has the right to possession without terminating the
lease; whether plaintiff has the right to retain the security
deposit) the case must be reversed. As this court said in
Dabney v. Philleo, 38 Cal.2d 60, 69-70 [237 P.2d 648] : "It is
apparent that there was a justiciable controversy between
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plaintiffs and Clifford's assignees. The trial court should have
expressly declared their rights. (Essick v. City of Los Angeles,
34 Cal.2d 614, 624 [213 P .2d 492] .) "
Another error warranting reversal is found in the trial
court's refusal to allow the introduction of evidence on defendant's counterclaim inasmuch as the action was not barred by
the applicable statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 337),
appears to be one of ejectment, and the claim would tend to
diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery.
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree that
the trial court erred in refusing to admit any evidence relating
to the party wall and that the cause should therefore be
remanded for a new trial on the issues raised by the counterclaim. On the basis of the provision in the lease that "Lessor
shall not be relieved of its said maintenance obligations with
respect to said party wall,'' defendant offered to prove that
"the lessor plaintiff both expressly and impliedly agreed to
maintain and keep in repair this party wall so far as the lessee
is concerned, in conjunction with its contractual liability with
the contiguous owner under a party wall agreement.'' The
counterclaim quotes the paragraph of the lease stating the
parties' obligations with respect to the party wall, and alleges
that the "plaintiff herein negligently and carelessly failed to
maintain said party wall in a safe condition.'' The words
"negligently and carelessly" do not prevent defendant from
proving a cause of action in contract (see L. B. Laboratories,
Inc. v. MitchelL, ante, pp. 59, 60 [244 P.2d 385]; George
v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 841 [205 P.2d
1037]), and since the alleged obligation was based on the
written lease, section 337 (1) appears to be the applicable
statute of limitation. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
rejecting the offer of proof.
On the other issues, I concur in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Edmonds.
EDMONDS, J.-The counterclaim of Briggs does not
charge Barker with any breach of contract to maintain a
party wall. At most, the pleading states a cause of action in
tort which would lie against either owner of the wall for per-
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mitting it to become a private nuisance. For that reason,
section 337 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
"[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing" is not the applicable
statute of limitations.
The lease does not contain any obligation <Jr promise, express
or implied, whereby Barker promises Briggs that the wall
will be kept in repair. It states that the demised premises are subject to a party wall agreement whereby Barker
has certain maintenance obligations. What these obligations
are, or with whom, is not specified. Presumably they are owed
to the other owner of the party wall. The lease further provides that Briggs is not to be liable for these obligations
except under certain circumstances which are alleged not to
have occurred. Barker is to remain obligated under the party
wall agreement. The most which can be construed from this
provision is that Briggs, as lessee, is to be protected against
an assumption of a covenant with some third party. The only
promise is that Briggs will not be held liable for any obligations under this separate agreement.
The facts alleged in the counterclaim do not support a
charge that Barker breached its obligation to Briggs to protect him from liability for the party wall agreement. There
is no claim that the cause of action is based upon the party
wall agreement, nor is it alleged that the agreement is in
writing and that Briggs is a third-party beneficiary of it.
(Of. Division of Lab. Law Enforcement v. Dennis, 81 Cal.
App.2d 306 [183 P.2d 932].)
Tagus Ranch Oo. v. Hughes, 64 Cal.App.2d 128 [148 P.2d
79], is cited for the proposition "that all obligations and
promises which the words of the writing necessarily import
must be regarded as included in the terms of the writing,
under section 337, Code of Civil Procedure." Although the
statement of the rule of that case is correct, it is not here
applicable. In the Tagus Ranch case, the instrument read:
. ''I . . . hereby confess and acknowledge that I have stolen
and embezzled from you" a certain sum of money. The
uourt, quite properly, construed this to imply, as a matter of
law, a promise to repay the sum embezzled. According to the
court, ''The obligation to repay could be established by the
use of these writings and there would be no need for evidence
of facts· and occurrences outside of those appearing on the
face of the instruments. Under these circumstances we think
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the writings in question are sufficient to bring the action
within the provisions of the four-year statute above mentioned." (P. 131.)
In support of this conclusion, the court relied upon O'Brien
v. Kilng, 174 Cal. 769 [164 P. 631], which stated the rule as
follows: "A cause of action is 'founded upon an instrument
of writing' when •the contract, obligation, or liability grows
'out of written instruments not remotely or ultimately, but
immediately.'" (P. 772.) The O'Brien case concerned an
instrument reading : ''Received from Miss Hannah 0 'Brien,
. . . $450 . . . at 5 per cent interest.'' The court said: "The
reasonable-indeed, the only reasonable-meaning of these
words is that the money was received as a loan at the specified
interest rate. A loan being established by the writing, a
promise to repay is implied by necessary inference of law
!IDd fact. Such promise is embodied in the language of the
writing, although not expressed in the words 'I promise to
pay.' " (P. 773.) According to the court, "promises 'merely
implied by law' from a situation evidenced by a writing, i.e.,
quasi contracts, are not within the statutory provision under
discussion. The promise must be one arising directly from
the writing itself, and included in its terms. But in determining whether the obligation is 'supported by an express
promise or stipulation in the written instrument,' we must
regard, as included in the terms of the writing, all obligations and promises which its words necessarily import.''
(P. 774.)
In McCarthy v. Mt. Tecarte L. &; W. Oo., 111 Cal. 328
[43 P. 956], the plaintiff, director of the corporation, attempted to rely upon a resolution of the board of directors
appointing him superintendent of the company. The resolution did not fix any compensation for the position, and plaintiff was entitled to none unless the circumstances raised an
implied assumpsit. The court said: "But a cause of action
is not upon a contract founded upon an instrument in writing,
within the meaning of the code, merely because it is in some
way remotely or indirectly connected with such an instrument, or because the instrument would be a link in the chain
of evidence establishing the cause of action. In order to be·
founded upon an instrument in writing, the instrument must,
itself, contain a contract to do the thing for the nonperformance of which the action. is brought." (P. 340.) Therefore,
the court concluded, the plaintiff's cause of action, not being
based upon a written instrument, was barred by section 339 (1).
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It summarized the situation as follows: "Appellant could not
have been precluded from showing affirmatively that no compensation was intended or expected, upon the ground that it
would have been an attempt to contradict a written instrument. If respondent have any cause of action, it is upon an
understanding of appellant and the expectation of respondent
that he would be compensated, which may be implied, if the
evidence be sufficient, from all of the circumstances of the
case, and not upon any written instrument." (P. 342.)
In the present case, the lease provision that Barker will
remain obligated upon the separate party wall agreement
may be some evidence of its liability in tort for failure to
maintain the wall. But it would not be precluded by the
rule of integration from proving that"it is not subject to such
liability. From all that appears, its obligations under the,
agreement may have been no more than to paint or light the
wall. The lease contains no promise that Barker will repair
the wall, or so maintain it that it will not b!:!come a nuisance.
If this is Barker's obligation, it can be proved only by evidence of the agreement or other evidence outside the lease.
The counterclaim is based upon Barker's negligence and carelessness in maintaining the wall, as a result of which it became a hazard. Barker's liability, if any, for this condition
does not arise "immediately" out of a written instrument.
The lease does not contain a contract to keep the wall in repair,
for nonperformance of which the action is brought. Therefore, the action is barred by section 339(1) of the Code of
Civil Procedure which requires that an action "upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument
in writing" must be commenced within two years.
As another ground for reversa,l of the judgment, it is held
that Briggs stated a cause of action for declaratory relief
and the trial court erred in deciding that he was not entitled
to such a judgment. (Dabney v. Philleo, 38 Cal.2d 60, 70 (237
P.2d 648] ; Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Ca1.2d 614, 624
[213 P.2d 492].) However, whether, under all of the circumstances, a declaration of the rights of the parties is necessary or proper is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of
that discretion, which does not appear here, its decision will
not be disturbed upon appeal. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1061; Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 34 Cal.2d 442, 448 [211 P.2d
302, 19 A.L.R.2d 1268] ; California Physicians' Service v. Gar-
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rison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 801 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.L.R. 306]; Moss
v. Moss, 20 Oal.2d 640, 643-644 [128 P.2d 526, 141 A.L.R.
1422); Cutting v. B1·yan, 206 Cal. 254,257 [274 P. 326].)
Barker's complaint and supplemental complaint alleged that
Briggs was in default under the second paragraph of the
lease by failure to furnish certified statements and pay the
additional rental of 60 per cent of the gross income or receipts
in excess of $25,000 derived in ·any maimer, directly or indirectly, from the use or occupancy of the premises. The pleader
claimed the right, by reason of these defaults, to reenter and
repossess the premises without terminating the lease. According to the supplemental complaint, the lease does not authorize any allocation or proration of receipts between the demised
premises and the other parking lots not belonging to Barker.
By amended answer to the complaint and answer to the
.supplemental complaint, Briggs admitted his failure to file a
certified statement within the proper time in 1948, but claimed
that Barker had waived the provisions of the lease in this respect by accepting, in prior years, unverified statements later
than the time specified. He denied that the 1949 statement
did not comply with the lease. Briggs also denied that he
had failed to pay the additional rental provided in the lease
and was in default. Therefore, he said, Barker is not entitled
to reenter and repossess the premises without terminating the
lease. According to Briggs, ''The dispute, if any, over the
amount of rent owed ... arises from the manner in which
defendant has apportioned gross receipts from the operation
of all of defendant's parking lots to the use or occupancy of
the demised premises. . . . Plaintiff is not entitled to receipts
from the parking of cars on the adjoining lots not owned by
plaintiff.''
As stated by Briggs in his cross.complaint, it was his custom
to operate the demised premises and two other lots as a single
unit from time to time and he alleged that he maintained
records to show "the gross profits fairly attributable to the
use and occupancy of the demised premises.'' He claimed the
right under the lease "to allocate gross income or receipts to
the parking lot on which a particular automobile is parked
when overflow cars enter the demised premises but are parked
on adjoining lots." He also pleaded that "his method of allocating gross income or receipts as between the demised premises and other parking lots operated as a unit with the demised
premises constitutes a fair and reasonable method of allocation and that cross-defendant received its just, fair and pro-
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portional share of the gross income or receipts attributable to
the use or occupancy of the demised premises.'' According to
Briggs, unless he secures a declaration of his rights Barker
11
will endeavor to terminate and cancel the rights of crosscomplainant in and to the lease. . . and will forfeit and use
the deposit of the cross-complainant put up on said lease.''
The basic issues joined by the pleadings were simply whether
Briggs was in default under the terms of the lease and, if so,
whether Barker was entitled to repossession without terminating the lease. Insofar as the alleged default in payment of
additional rentals is concerned, Briggs asserted that he was
entitled to allocate receipts between the several lots. No new
issue was raised by the cross-complaint for declaratory relief.
''The purpose of section 1060 et seq. of the Code of Civil
Procedure, providing for actions for declaratory reliefr is to
provide a ready and speedy remedy in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective
parties. By section 1061 the court is permitted to refuse to
exercise the power in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary under the circumstances. This is
such a case. All the issues raised in the cross-complaint can
be readily determined in the trial of the special defenses raised
in the answer and, because this affirmatively appears upon the
face of the pleading, the trial court properly refused to exercise the power granted by these sections of the code.'' (Welfare
Inv. Co. v. Stowell, 132 Cal.App. 275, 278 [22 P.2d 529] ;
Sunset Scavenger Corp. v. Odd<Ju, 11 Cal.App.2d 92, 96 [53
P.2d 188].)
The trial court found that in 1946 Briggs did not furnish
a report prepared and certified as required by the lease and
that the reports which he supplied in 1947, 1948 and 1949
were neither certified nor presented within the time provided by the lease. With regard to these reports, it said that,
"It is not true that these ·reports correctly reflected the gross
income attributable to the use and occupation by the defendant
of the leased premises.'' As a portion of this finding concerning reports, the court declared,: "It is not true that the plain..
tiff, . . . waived these defaults, or led the defendant to believe
that strict compliance in the future with the terms of the Lease
would not be required.''
The court then found that a certified report was furnished
within the proper time for the year 1949, but that it showed
a gross revenue attributable to the leased premises of $35,485 .60, rather than the sum of $31,179.17 which Briggs reported
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to Barker. This report, the court said, did not correctly
reflect the gross income attributable to the use of the premises. The court also found that the payment of $3,707.50
which Briggs tendered after commencement of the action,
should have been in the amount' of $6,291.36. From these
findings, the court concluded that Barker was entitled to a
judgment for immediate possession of the property and that
Briggs was not entitled to a declaratory judgment.
Because of asserted deficiencies in the findings, it is now
held that the judgment must be reversed. However, even if
we assume that the findings are insufficient, this court "may
make findings of fact contrary to, or in addition to, those
made by the trial court." (Code Civ. Proc. § 956a.) In
Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 266 [280 P. 970], the
court explained the purpose of section 956a to be that, "whenever possible, and the interests of justice would seem to
require, the reviewing court should have the power to make
new findings contrary to or in addition to those made by the
trial court, either on the record presented or on new evidence
to be taken under the direction of the court, all with references to material issues framed by the pleadings, to the end
that the judgment or order appealed from may be affirmed
and further litigation terminated." The constitutional and
statutory provisions which empower this court to affirm,
modify or direct the entry of a final judgment are to be
liberally construed toward the end that a cause may be disposed of on a single appeal. (Cal. Canst., art. VI, § 4% ; Code
Civ. Proc. §§53, 956a; American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van
Winkle, ante, pp. 210, 219 [246 P.2d 935] ; T1tpman v. Haberkern, supra; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 547 [134 P.2d
217] ; Culjak v. Better Built Hames, 58 Cal..A.pp.2d 720, 725
[137 P.2d 492] .)
Where the error in an action for declaratory relief consists
of entering a judgment of dismissal rather than decreeing
expressly that the complainant is not entitled to declarations
in his favor (as is implied by the judgment of dismissal), the
· court may modify the judgment by inserting an express declaration of the rights of the parties. (Essick v. City of Los
Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 624-625 [213 P.2d 492] .) In the
Essick case the judgment was affirmed, as modified, although
the trial court erroneously failed to declare the rights of the
parties. Because the evidence contained in the record was
sufficient to empower the court to modify the judgment, the
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error in entering a judgment of dismissal was not prejudicial.
Under the circumstances, no reversal was rt!quired.
The present decision implicitly approves the trial court's
findings, as far as they go, with the exception of the specification of the amount of additional rental which Briggs should
have paid, a determination which is unnecessary to the judgment. These findings are sufficient to sustain the judgment
restoring Barker to possession and allowing attorney's fees
and costs. Even if additional findings were necessary, the
record would enable this court to supply them and modify the
judgment. No extrinsic evidence has been offered to aid in
the interpretation of the terms of the lease, nor is it contended
that any such evidence is required. The document is in evidence and may as readily be interpreted by this court as by
the trial court.
The majority have gone halfway in supplying the :findings
which they say are missing by determining that, if Briggs has
breached the terms of the lease, Barker is entitled to possession
without terminating the lease and may retain the security
deposit in accordance with its terms. This conclusion is based
upon the correct interpretation of the lease provisions. However, no issue was raised by the cross-complaint concerning
either of these points and there was no necessity to grant
declaratory relief for the sole purpose of deciding them.
"As to the principles governing appellate courts in considering the adequacy of findings to dispose of issues and support a judgment it is a general rule that 'Even though a finding might have been more clearly phrased, it is sufficient if
its language is clear enough to indicate what the court intended; and if there are findings sufficient to support ·the
judgment, they are not vitiated by the unintelligibility of
others. Any uncertainty in the findings will be construed so
as to support the judgment rather than to defeat it.' . . . It
is also to b!l noted that while full findings are required upon
all material issues a judgment will not be set aside on appeal
because of a failure to make an express finding upon an issue
if a finding thereon, consistent with the judgment, results by
necessary implication from the express findings which are
made." (Richter v. Walker, 36 Ca.l.2d 634, 639-640 [226 P.2d
593) .)
Also, "[i]t is well settled, in spite of the fact that section
633 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that facts and
conclusions must be separately stated, that a finding may be
18 C.2d-22
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regarded as one of fact, although mistakenly placed among
the conclusions of law." (Linberg v. Stanto, 211 Cal. 771,
776 [297 P. 9, 75 A.L.R. 555] .) "It is also the. rule that findings are sufficient if they can be made certain by reference to
the record" (Ethel D. Co. v. Industria,l Ace. Com., 219 Cal.
699, 708 [28 P.2d 919]) or the pleadings. (Kennedy~ Shaw
Lbr. Co. v. S. S. Const. Co., 123 Cal. 584,585-586 [56 P. 457].)
Although the findings in this case are far from ideal, and
should have been drawn with more certainty, the weakD.ess in
them is not fatally defective. (Richter v. Walker, supra.)
Upon the ultimate fact of whether Briggs was in default under
the provisions of the lease, the court found that he did not
report the proper gross receipts attributable to the use and
occupation of the leased premises. From a review of the
record, it is obvious that the finding also was intended to
encompass a failure to pay the correct amount of additional
rental.
The majority object to the findings of an inoorrect report of
gross receipts upon the ground that they could ''refer either
to the overflow and night parking receipts or to the gross receipts on cars actually parked on the Spring Street lot.''
However, "[t]he court's -finding was upon the ultimate fact
in issue and was therefore sufficient." (Estate of Janes,
18 Cal.2d 512, 514 (116 P.2d 438].) It was not necessary for
the court also to find upon the probative facts from which it
deduced the ultimate fact of failure to comply with the provisions of the lease. (Klein v. Milne, 198 Cal. 71, 75 [243 P.
420].)
Ample support for the finding that Briggs failed properly
to account for gross receipts is provided by the undisputed
evidence that, for more than a year, no records were kept of
gross receipts for night parking. This breach of the lease
is sufficient of itself to give Barker the right to possession.
In addition, there is some indication in the record that the
trial court intended to construe the lease contrary to Briggs'
claim of a right to allocate receipts to various lots. However,
the finding being supported by other sufficient evidence, it is
unnecessary for this court to consider that question of interpretation. "It is, of course, immaterial that the theory
upon which the judgment may be affirmed is not identical
with that relied upon by plaintiffs or by the trial court, since
plaintiffs are required only to plead and prove facts sufficient
to justify relief, and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed if the findings, supported by the evidence, are sufficient
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to warrant the relief granted on any legal theory." (Sears v.
Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 140-141 [163 P.2d 443] .)
Among the findings of fact there is none directed specifically
to the question of whether Barker has the right to possession
without terminating the lease. However, there is a so-called
conclusion of law providing: 1 1 That plaintiff is entitled . . .
to be placed in the immediate possession of said real property." This is, in effect, a finding upon an ultimate fact in
issue, and may be treated as such. (liinberg v. Stanto, supra.)
Even if it were not to be considered as a finding of fact, a
determination that Barker is entitled to immediate possession
of the property results by necessary implication from the express finding that Briggs is in default under the lease. It
is obvious from the lease, as construed by the majority, that,
if Briggs is in default, Barker is entitled to possession without terminating the lease. The finding must be interpreted
to include the right to continue the obligations of the lease.
The only issue raised by the pleadings was whether the lease
had been breached so that Barker had the right to possession
without terminating it. There was no issue as to whether
he had the right to possession, but not the right to continue
the lease in effect.
Construing the findings so as to support the judgment
rather than defeat it (Richter v. Walker, supra,) I conclude
that they are sufficient to determine the cause without the
necessity of making additional findings. Those which were
made, supported by sufficient evidence, eliminated any necessity for determining whether Briggs' interpretation of the
lease in regard to allocation of rentals was correct. The court
having found that Briggs was no longer entitled to possession
of the property, his interpretation of the additional rental
provision became an immaterial issue and the failure to find
thereon does not constitute prejudicial error. (Merrill v.
Gordon & Harrison, 208 Cal. 1, 6 r279 P. 996]; Woodhead v.
W 1,'lkinson, 181 Cal. 599, 602 [185 P . 851, 10 A.L.R. 291] .)
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgme;nt.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November
3, 1952. Edmonds, J ., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

